In an attempt to throw the authorities off his trail, William Tasso < XXXX@XXXXX.COM > transmitted:
This approach is likely of _some_ value; it would mean that in order
for someone to obtain information from "ezvasquez's" mail account,
they would have to be able to tamper with servers in foreign
countries, and that that won't be as simple as bribing some local
person that only makes $50/month to whom an extra $20 is a lot.
However, it does not address the other side of the threat model.
If "ezvasquez," who lives in Dangeria, is sending commercial messages
containing dangerously sensitive information to other people that also
live in Dangeria but who don't care to secure their own mail, then
there's an additional unaddressable threat.
The "ezpvasquez" mail might be essentially unassailable based on the
resources available in Dangeria. But if sales (and communications)
are going to "Mr Pink" (who doesn't think crypto is important), then
the Dangerian criminal elements can bribe "Mr Pink"'s ISP to get
copies of what "ezpvasquez" sent him as well as his responses.
Based on this, I don't think there's any good news there for
"ezpvasquez." Communications can only be as secure as the measures
taken by BOTH sides, and if you can't trust the other side, you're
let name="cbbrowne" and tld="gmail.com" in name ^ "@" ^ tld;;
Rules of the Evil Overlord #45. "I will make sure I have a clear
understanding of who is responsible for what in my organization. For
example, if my general screws up I will not draw my weapon, point it
at him, say "And here is the price for failure," then suddenly turn
and kill some random underling." < http://www.yqcomputer.com/